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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Appellee,

:

v.

:

WILLIAM ROBERT CUMMINS,

:

Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 900419-CA

Category No. 2

:

PETITION FOR REHEARING
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
The issues presented in this petition for rehearing
are:
1.

Can the Court determine on the present record that

the absence of the mental health expert's testimony did not
prejudice defendant?
2.

Did the Court incorrectly remand this matter for

the trial court to determine whether the prejudice prong of the
ineffective assistance of counsel test had been met?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Twenty days before trial, defense counsel filed a
belated notice of intent to argue a mental state defense, along
with a motion for appointment of a psychiatrist to determine if
defendant had the requisite mental state for murder and an expert
to determine defendant's blood alcohol content on the night of
the homicide.

The court granted the motion regarding the

toxicology expert and Dr. Bryan Finkle testified about what

defendant's blood alcohol level would have been if he drank that
night what he claimed he did.

Dr. Finkle also testified

extensively about the effects on reason, memory and judgment at
the level defendant would have attained•

The court denied the

motion for appointment of a psychiatrist because it was untimely
under Utah Code Ann. S 77-14-3 (1990).
Defendant testified in detail about his actions on the
night of the homicide; he maintained that he had not participated
in the beating, but instead, had helped the victim.

At the

conclusion of the evidence, the jury was instructed on the
intoxication defense and defense counsel argued that defense
almost exclusively.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The pertinent facts are included in the statement of
the case and in the body of this petition.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This Court can determine that counsel was not
ineffective on the present record.

Defendant testified as to how

much he drank the night of the crime. A toxicologist testified
at length about the effect of that much alcohol on a person's
reason, memory, and judgment.

The jury was instructed on the

intoxication defense and trial counsel argued that defense almost
exclusively to the jury.

In other words, defendant was not

precluded from presenting an intoxication defense.

The only

thing defendant did not have was a mental health expert to
speculate to the jury about whether defendant had the requisite

2

mental state during the beating.

However, defendant testified in

detail about his actions that night; specifically, he claimed
that he did not participate in the fatal beating.

This testimony

did more to undermine defendant's intoxication defense than any
speculation about mental state which might have been presented by
a mental health expert.
This matter was remanded for the trial court to take
evidence and then to determine whether trial counsel was
ineffective.

Under rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,

a remand is solely for the purpose of making factual findings;
the matter is then sent back to the appellate court to determine
whether counsel had provided ineffective assistance.

If the

Court still decides to remand, the remand should be for the
limited purpose of taking evidence and entering factual findings.
INTRODUCTION
A petition for rehearing is appropriate when the Court
has overlooked or misapprehended points of law or fact.
App. P. 35(a).

Utah R.

The petition for rehearing is properly before the

Court and should be granted.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT'S OWN TESTIMONY UNDERMINED HIS
INTOXICATION DEFENSE MORE THAN ANY
SPECULATIVE TESTIMONY ABOUT MENTAL STATE FROM
A PSYCHIATRIST COULD HAVE.
This Court should not remand for further factual
findings because the record supports a legal conclusion that
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defendant was not prejudiced by the absence of testimony by a
mental health expert.
The Court's decision is premised on the conclusion that
defendant was precluded from presenting an intoxication defense
by counsel's untimely filing of a notice to claim alibi.1
is factually incorrect.

That

Although no psychiatrist was appointed,

the court did appoint a toxicologistf Dr. Bryan Finkle, who
testified at length about defendant's blood alcohol level based
on defendant's testimony of what he drank (Transcript Vol. IV at
523-74).

Dr. Finkle said that, as a non-psychologist, he did not

have the expertise to testify about "the behavior that's involved
in one taking responsibility for one's actions"
60).

(Vol. IV at 559-

However, Dr. Finkle did testify that a social drinker would

tend to become unconscious at the blood alcohol level that fit
defendant's testimony of alcohol consumption (Vol. IV at 553).
The high level extrapolated from defendant's testimony could
cause impaired judgment (Vol. IV at 555); impaired reasoning and
Apparently, the Court also assumes that defendant had a
mental health expert waiting in the wings to testify. State v.
Cummins, Case No. 900419-CA, slip op. at 17 (Utah App. Aug. 25,
1992) ("[A]n evidentiary hearing is appropriate . . .
to
determine the substance of the psychiatric expert's testimony. .
. . [W]e remand . . . with directions to hear the testimony of
defendant's excluded mental health expert."). That assumption is
not supported by the record.
There is nothing in the record
indicating that such an expert had been contacted; indeed,
counsel filed a request for a court appointed psychiatric expert
at the same time as the notice of intent to claim lack of
capacity to form intent (R. at 185-89). The indication from the
motions is that counsel wanted the court to appoint a
psychiatrist to determine defendant's mental state; there is no
indication that such an expert had been contacted and was
prepared to testify.
The court declined to appoint such an
expert.

4

ability to remember, i.e., blackouts (Vol. IV at 558); impaired
ability to make rational decisions and understand consequences of
actions (Vol. IV at 559); impaired ability to process information
from multiple inputs (Vol. IV at 561); and impaired ability to
judge the extent or severity of a fight (Vol. IV at 564).
On cross examination, Dr. Finkle agreed that an
inability to remember did not necessarily mean that a person
lacked intent to do the act while he was intoxicated (Vol. IV at
568).

The impairment of rational thinking was not an issue of

whether the drinker made good or bad decisions; it was an issue
of ability to take in information, process it, and arrive at a
decision (Vol. IV at 569). Finally, Dr. Finkle testified that a
person could do an act and, as a result of a high blood alcohol
level, have no knowledge either at the time of the act or after
that he did the act (Vol. IV at 570-71).

[

At the conclusion of the evidence, the jury was
instructed on the intoxication defense (R. at 340), and defense
counsel primarily argued that intoxication negated the mental
state for murder (Vol. IV at 638 and 649-59).

Thus, the Court is

factually incorrect when it implies that defendant "lost" the
defense because of an untimely filing of notice.

The only thing

defendant may have lost was the possible testimony from a mental
health expert reaching a conclusion that defendant could not have
had the requisite mental state for murder.

Extensive evidence of

the effects of intoxication, other than that conclusion, was
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provided by the toxicologist, Dr. Finkle, called by defense
counsel•
The only thing Dr. Finkle would not testify to was the
conclusion that defendant was so intoxicated that he could not
formulate the requisite mental state.

Even assuming that a

mental health expert would have so testified, there is no
reasonable probability that that additional testimony would have
produced a different trial result.

Defendant testified at length

about how much he drank the night of the beating (Vol. Ill at
458-69); however, he also testified in detail about his actions
that night (Vol. Ill at 470-85, 493-96, and 501-10, Vol. IV at
511-13).

Specifically, he claimed that he did not participate in

the beating.

Defendant testified clearly about his actions that

night, claiming to have blacked out only after helping the victim
to bed.

This testimony, far beyond any additional speculation by

an expert regarding defendant's mental state, most clearly
undermined the intoxication defense.

Cf. State v. Sisneros, 631

P.2d 856, 858-59 (Utah 1981) (confronted with expert evidence
that defendant's intoxication may have impaired his ability to
form intent, juxtaposed with evidence that defendant was coherent
and aware of what was going on around him, the jury "could
reasonably conclude that defendant maintained the requisite
intent"); State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 90-91 (Utah), cert, denied,
459 U.S. 988 (1982) (counsel must present defense of innocence if
defendant desires it, "even if the claim of innocence detracts
from other defenses presented by counsel"); State v. Shabata, 678
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P.2d 785, 790 (Utah 1984) (defendant's evidence was to the effect
that he had not caused the death; this theory precluded a
manslaughter instruction); State v. Bryan, 709 P.2d 257, 269-60
(Utah 1985) (evidence that defendant blacked out from
intoxication is not a defense to the mens rea of recklessness;
intoxication immaterial to manslaughter conviction); State v.
Padilla, 776 P.2d 1329, 1332 (Utah 1989) (defendant's defense was
one of innocence; consequently, a faulty jury instruction of
intoxication was harmless error); State v. Johnson, 784 P.2d
1135, 1139 (Utah 1989) (defendant testified as to amount he
drank; however, the evidence demonstrated that he was aware of
surroundings, understood questions, and recalled details after
the event).
POINT II
IF THIS MATTER IS REMANDED, IT SHOULD BE
SOLELY FOR THE PURPOSE OF MAKING FACTUAL
FINDINGS.
This Court has misapprehended and misapplied the law in
remanding this matter to the trial court to determine the
prejudice prong of the effective assistance of counsel test.
Court correctly states:
To successfully assert a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant
must show that (1) his counsel's performance
was objectively deficient, and (2) there
exists a reasonable probability that, absent
the deficient conduct, the verdict would have
been more favorable to defendant.
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The

Cummins, slip op. at 15 (citing State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401f 405
(Utah 1986)).

The second prong, known as the prejudice prong, as

explained in State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116 (Utah 1989):
"A reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome. '•
Id. at 124, n.15 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
694, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2068 (1984)).
This Court has remanded this matter for the limited
purposes of conducting an evidentiary hearing to take testimony
from a psychiatric expert and of determining whether defendant
was prejudiced by the absence of the expert's testimony at trial.
The Court cites "new Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 23B" as
support for this action; however, rule 23B provides for remand
solely for the trial court to take evidence and to enter findings
of fact.

After the trial court enters its findings, the legal

conclusion of whether trial counsel was ineffective is left to
the appellate* court.

If the present matter is remanded, it

should be solely for the purpose of taking evidence and entering
factual findings.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court should grant
rehearing and modify its opinion to a affirm the conviction or,
in the alternative, to remand solely for an evidentiary hearing.
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The State certifies that this petition is presented in
good faith and not for delay.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

^

day of September,

1992.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

AU

dHARLENE BARLOW
Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of
the foregoing petition for rehearing were mailed, postage
prepaid, to Robert M. Archuleta, attorney for defendant, 431
South 300 East, Suite 401, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this
day of September, 1992.
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